Chapter II

On April 19, 1776, 800 British, sent to destroy the stores at Concord, Mass., were fired upon by some provincials at Lexington, but succeeded in carrying out their mission. A fight at the bridge at Concord ensued, ending in the retreat of the British which developed into a rout, but at Lexington some semblance of order was restored by Lord Percy, who had hurried up with re-enforcements. The British then fell back twenty miles to Boston, their retreat much hampered by the increasing number of Colonial minute-men. The latter lost but 93 men, whereas their adversaries counted 273 men out of action. (1)

Three days later, April 22nd, the initial step was taken to organize a combined defense against England, when the Massachusetts Assembly passed a unanimous resolution that a force of 30,000 men was needed for the defense of that colony, and decided that 13,000 men should be raised at once, trusting that the remainder would be furnished by the other New England colonies. (2) The organization of these hasty levies was accomplished by giving a captain's commission to any one enrolling a company of fifty-nine men and a colonel's commission for a regiment composed of ten such companies. This system, which made the ability to raise men the sole qualification for command, is emphasized for the reason that it has persisted until recent times, and was invariably employed at the beginning of all our wars down to the War of the Rebellion. (3)

The engagement at Concord and Lexington was the signal for the assembling near Boston of the militia and minutemen of all the New England colonies, and on June 17th these half-organized troops under General Artemas Ward fought the battle of Bunker Hill, under a common commander whom they recognized by common courtesy only. Three assaults were made on the breastworks and redoubt held by the colonists, (4) resulting in a loss to the British of 89 officers and 965 men, a total in killed and wounded nearly 50 per cent greater than in any subsequent action of the war. The American casualties were confined to 449 in all, and occurred, for the major part, during the retreat across Charlestown Neck after their ammunition had given out. (5)

The gallantry of defense was due to the fact that the entrenchments were constructed under the supervision of, and the American troops commanded by, veteran officers in whom the men had the utmost confidence. It rendered Gage's victory so costly and proved such a surprise that the British were reduced to the defensive for nearly a year. (6) As General Upton pertinently remarks,

"The lesson to be learned from this remarkable conflict is the value of trained officers in command of raw troops, a lesson which neither our statesmen nor our historians have ever been able to appreciate," and he goes on to say that:

"without pausing to discover the secret of the defense of Bunker Hill, the mistaken conviction seized the public mind that the militia were invincible and that patriotism was the sole qualification for a soldier's calling___a fallacy which paralyzed the military legislation of the Revolution and constantly jeopardized our liberties by inducing the political leaders of the time to rely too confidently upon raw and undisciplined levies." (7)

Meanwhile, on May 10th, the fort at Ticonderoga had been captured by a force of Colonials under Ethan Allen, and on the same day the Second Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia. The Revolution had then assumed such headway as to force that body to exercise the functions of civil government, and it promptly assumed not only legislative but executive powers. Finding itself not clothed with authority to levy taxes or raise revenue, it was obliged to emit bills of credit, the redemption of which was pledged by the twelve "United Colonies." The financial system thus inaugurated, having no other basis than public faith in the eventual success of the American cause, virtually neutralized the power to create and support armies. Local interests, passions, and prejudices soon became paramount and, as a result of the feeble and exhaustive military policy followed, Congress was finally reduced to the helplessness of an advisory body, bereft of power to call out or support a single soldier save with the assistance and concurrence of the colonies____all of which could have been prevented had Congress been clothed with sovereign authority to utilize the entire resources of the country. (8) Military legislation was thus made from the very start to depend mainly upon the collective wisdom of an assembly of men who, as far as their individual experience was concerned, were wholly devoid of military knowledge, a state of affairs which, in many instances, has prevailed in Congress until the present day.

Shortly after the troops arrived in the vicinity of Boston prior to the battle of Bunker Hill, it became evident that the struggle would not be confined to the New England colonies alone, and that, in order to prevent the disintegration and dispersal of the force already collected, it would have to be adopted as a Continental Army owing allegiance to the United Colonies exclusively.* Accordingly, on June 14, 1775, Congress authorized the raising of ten companies of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, the term of enlistment being fixed at one year.
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*Early in June, 1775, General Nathaniel Greene made certain recommendations respecting this new army, the wisdom of which was fully confirmed by subsequent events. The six conditions which he declared indispensable for immediate success were: (1) There should be one commander-in-chief; (2) the army should be enlisted "during the war"; (3) a system of bounties should be established in order to provide for the families of soldiers in the field; (4) the troops should serve wherever required throughout the colonies; (5) funds for the complete equipment and support of the army according to the demands of the war should be borrowed; and (6) independence should be declared at once and every resource of every colony pledged to its support.__Greene, The Life of Nathaniel Greene, I, pp. 123, 124, 127-129.
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These were the first troops raised under the authority of the United Colonies with the title of The American Continental Army, and they formed the nucleus of the forces which eventually achieved American independence. On the following day, George Washington was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and on July 3rd he assumed command at Cambridge, Mass., of the army investing Boston, numbering 17,000 men, every one of whose enlistments was to expire before the end of the year. On July 18th Congress recommended:

"to the inhabitants of the United English Colonies that all able-bodied, effective men, between 16 and 50 years of age, be formed into companies of militia (9)....That the officers of each company be chosen by the respective companies," and, imitating the action of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, passed the following resolution:

"That one-fourth part of the militia be selected as minute-men of such men as are willing to enter into this necessary service, formed into companies and battalions, and their officers chosen and commissioned as aforesaid, to be ready at shortest notice to march to any place where their assistance may be required for the defense of their own or neighboring colony." (10)

This measure is of special interest in that it was our first scheme of mobilization. (11)

Three days later, July 21st, Congress authorized Washington to maintain in the vicinity of Boston such a force as he thought necessary, provided it did not exceed 22,000 men, and on July 25th it fixed the number of troops for the Northern Department, New York, at 5,000. In organizing these troops on a Continental basis, commissions signed in blank by the President of Congress were sent to the various colonies to be filled out with the necessary names. (12) During the course of the year Congress gradually increased the size of the Continental Army, but, nourishing hopes for an early peace, could not be induced to prolong the term of enlistment beyond 1776.

Notwithstanding the power vested in him, Washington found himself compelled, on account of the slowness with which the recruits presented themselves, (13) to call for 5,000 militia and minute-men to replace the troops whose enlistments would expire on December first. (14) General Schuyler in New York experienced great difficulty in this respect with the New England troops, (15) while Washington had his patience sorely tried by the Connecticut contingent which decamped the instant its service expired. (16) "Those who are familiar with our military history will not be surprised at the conduct of these Connecticut troops. Each succeeding year of the Revolutionary struggle found American soldiers behaving in like manner; and during the War of the Rebellion a similar course was followed by the regiments whose terms of service expired on the morning of the first battle of Bull Run." (17)

The officers too gave Washington an immense deal of unnecessary trouble, (18) and Congress found itself compelled to provide new troops to replace those whose terms would expire before the year was out, (19) as well as to recommend to the various colonial legislatures that punishment be inflicted upon persons harboring deserters, whose number was rapidly augmenting. (20) Desertion is an evil inseparable from the method of bounties which was then beginning to be introduced, and it must be distinctly remembered that "any system of voluntary enlistments necessarily places a government in the position of a suppliant, and when patriotism and popular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill the ranks, resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits." Recognizing the danger of admitting such a principle, Congress passed a resolution on December 6, 1775, "That the charge of bounty in the account exhibited by Rhode Island against the United Colonies be not allowed." Yet in spite of this disapproval, bounties were paid throughout the Revolution, producing both endless trouble and discontent just as they did during the War of the Rebellion. (21)

Irrespective of the necessity, however great, of employing untrained troops, history demonstrates that needless extravagance, frequently attended by inaction and disaster, is the inevitable result. This was the case during the Campaign of 1775. The only military operations of the army about Boston that year were confined to the battles of Concord, Lexington and Bunker Hill, all fought before any of the troops were taken into Continental pay. As Upton points out: (22)

"When Washington took command his army numbered 17,000 men, but the number fit for duty did not exceed 14,500. The strength of the enemy was estimated by the council of war at 11,500; but after deducting the sick and wounded his real effective strength was not over 6,500. Notwithstanding this disparity in numbers neither Washington nor his generals deemed it prudent to attack, and the year passed away in hopeless inactivity."

The only important offensive operation was the invasion of Canada by two distinct forces; one, composed of 3,000 troops under Generals Schuyler and Montgomery, assembled at Ticonderoga in August, but the former's ill-health compelled him to relinquish his command, while the latter, after spending weeks in reducing the fort at St. John's, eventually occupied Montreal on November 12th. (23) The other expedition, undertaken at the instigation of a Congressional committee, was composed of 1, 100 men under General Benedict Arnold. Leaving Cambridge on September 17th, it embarked at Newport on the 19th, reached Gardner, Maine, on the 20th and started for Quebec three days later. After untold hardships during the march through the Maine wilderness, Arnold arrived at Port Levis, opposite Quebec, on November 9th, with his force reduced to 750 men. A storm lasting three days suspended further operations, but, on the 14th, spurred on by the necessity of action, largely because of the approaching expiration of the terms of enlistment of nearly all his men, (24) Arnold repeated Wolfe's feat in climbing the steep ascent and demanded the surrender of the city. The British garrison had meanwhile been re-enforced to 2,000 and the Americans were compelled on the 19th to retire to Point-aux-Trembles, where they were joined by Montgomery on December first, the combined forces not exceeding 1,000 men.

A second demand for surrender (December 6th) and a feeble bombardment proving equally ineffectual, it was resolved on the 16th to assault the place, "but it was not until the night of the thirtieth, when but one day of legal service remained for a large portion of the troops, that the preparations were complete." (25) On the last day of the year a desperate attack was made; Montgomery was killed, Arnold badly wounded, 60 men were dead or hors de combat and 426 were captured. The invasion of Canada thus ended in a hopeless disaster (26) and, except for Bunker Hill, virtually nothing had been achieved by the Americans.

"The total number of troops in Continental pay during the campaign of 1775, as appears from the report of the Secretary of War, Henry Knox, submitted to Congress in 1790, was 27,443. In addition to the above, it is estimated that the colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, furnished 10,180 militia, making the whole American Army 37, 623. For the most part this force, from want of supplies, organization, and discipline, was maintained at public expense in a state of demoralizing inactivity." (27)

The events of the year 1775 have been dwelt upon at considerable length for the reason that they, like those of the entire Revolution, are necessary for an intelligent understanding of our subsequent military history. The seeds of the vicious military policy sown in those years have been reaped during every succeeding generation. We shall also have occasion to make frequent quotations from Washington's correspondence because he, as the commander-in-chief and the principal figure of the Revolution, was called upon to combat every single mistake in the military policy of that time. No other person was in a better position than he to pass judgment upon this all-important subject, and his comments are today quite as worthy of legislative consideration as when they were originally written.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II (War of the Revolution)

1. Carrington, p.11; Fiske, pp. 121-126; Upton, p. 1.

2. Upton, P.1; Carrington, p.84

3. Upton, p.1

4.The British force numbered about 3,000; the Americans, 1,500.__ Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754 to 1900, p.226. This work was compiled from official sources by Newton A. Strait.

5. Upton, p.2; Carrington, pp. 92-111; Lossing, I, pp. 540-547; Fiske, I, pp. 138-144.

6. Upton, p.2; Carrington, p. 116; Fiske, I, p. 146. Owing to the dissatisfaction of the British Ministry, Gage was superseded by General Howe.

7. Upton, p.2.

8. "Fear of a standing army and corresponding jealousy of military dictation, were additional reasons for making the Continental Congress rely upon its own judgment in legislation pertaining to army matters."___Upton, p.4.

9. These companies were "to consist of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 1 clerk, 1 drummer, 1 fifer, and 58 privates." They "were to be formed into regiments and battalions, each with 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 1 adjutant, and 1 quartermaster, all officers above the rank of captain being appointed by the provincial assemblies or conventions, or if in recess by the committees of safety. The militia could only be called out with the consent of the State legislatures. They were specially intended for home defense and to make head against forays of the enemy in the absence of the Regular or Continental Army."___Upton, p.8.

10. "Such of the minute men as desired it were to be relieved by drafts from the whole body of the militia once in four months."___Upton, p.8

11. Upton, p.8.

12. Four hundred commissions were sent to General Schuyler for the Northern District alone.

13. The returns show that up to November 19th only 966 men had enlisted.

14. The militia were to report in camp by December 10th and to remain in service until January 15, 1776.__upton, p.6

15. "Nothing can surpass the impatience of the troops from the New England colonies to get to their firesides. Near three hundred of them arrived a few days ago, unable to do any duty; but as soon as I administered that grand specific, a discharge, they instantly acquired health, and rather than be detained a few days to cross Lake George , they undertook a march from here of two hundred miles with the greatest alacrity....Our army requires to be put on a different footing."__ General Schuyler to Washington, date not given but probably the end of November or beginning of December, 1775. Sparks, The Writings of George Washington III, footnote on p.191.

16. "The reason of my giving you the trouble of this, is the late extraordinary and reprehensible conduct of some of the Connecticut troops. Some time ago, apprehending that some of them might incline to go home, when the time of their enlistment should be up, I applied to the officers of the several regiments to know whether it would be agreeable to the men to continue until the 1st of January, or until a sufficient number of other forces could be raised to supply their place, who informed me, that they believed the whole of them would readily stay till that could be effected. Having discovered last week, that they were very uneasy to leave the service, and determined upon it, I thought it expedient to summon the general officers at headquarters, and invite a delegation of the general court to be present, that suitable measures might be adopted for the defense and support of our lines. The result was that 3,000 of the minute men and militia of this province and 2,000 men from New Hampshire, should be called in by the 10th inst. for that purpose. With this determination the Connecticut troops were made acquainted, and requested and ordered to remain here, as the time of most of them would not be out before the 10th, when they would be relieved. Notwithstanding this, yesterday morning most of them resolved to leave the camp. Many went off, and the utmost vigilance and industry were used to apprehend them. Several got away with their arms and ammunition."___ Washington to Governor Trumbull, December 2, 1775. Sparks, III, pp. 182-183.

17. Upton, p. 7

18. "I had like to have forgotten what sits heaviest upon mind, the new arrangement of officers. "Although we have now enough to constitute the new corps, it has employed the general officers and myself ever since Thursday last, and we are nearly as we began. Connecticut wants no Massachusetts men in her corps, Massachusetts thinks there is no necessity for a Rhode Islander to be introduced into hers, and New Hampshire says it is very hard that her valuable and experienced officers, who are willing to serve, should be discarded, because her own regiments under the new establishment, can not provide for them. In short, after a few days' labor, I expect that numbers of officers who have given in their names to serve, must be discarded from the Massachusetts corps, where the regiments have been numerous, and the number in them small, and that of Connecticut will be completed with a fresh recruit of officers from her own government." Washington to Joseph Reed, November 8, 1775. Sparks, III, p. 150-151.

19. A committee was appointed to consult with Washington and the colonies of Connecticut, Rhode island, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. It met at Cambridge on October 18, 1775, conferred with delegates from the four Colonies and, after a consultation with Washington and his council of war, reported "that the army around Boston ought not to be less than 20,370 men, organized into 26 regiments of 8 companies each, exclusive of the artillery and riflemen." Congress apportioned these 26 regiments as follows: Sixteen to Massachusetts, 5 to Connecticut, 2 to Rhode Island and 3 to New Hampshire. It was hoped that the regiments might be largely recruited from the troops then around Boston, the vacancies being filled by new levies."___Upton, p.4

20. On November 4, 1775, Congress recommended the enactment of laws prescribing "a punishment of not less than $30 nor more than $50 upon such as knowingly harbor deserters" and if unable to pay the fine "to be punished with whipping, not exceeding 30 lashes for each offense."__ Upton, p.7.

21. See below, pp.147-149.

22. The Military Policy of the United States, p.9

23. Carrington, pp. 127-129.

24. "At this juncture three of Arnold's captains refused to serve under him any longer, their time of service would expire at the end of the month, and there was every indication that open mutiny would replace the harmony which had thus far prevailed. An earnest appeal from Montgomery restored them to duty."___Carrington, p.134.

25. Ibid, p. 134.

26. Carrington, pp. 121-125, 130-137; Lossing, I, pp. 190-200; Fiske, I, pp. 165-168; zupyon, p.9

27. Upton, p.9.