Chapter III Pages: 40-42

As a result of the blundering military policy pursued, the maximum number of troops raised in any year (1) was 89,661, of whom 42,700 were militia. (2) Owing to the principal dependence being placed upon untrained men, the largest force that Washington was able to assemble for battle was less than 17,000; at Trenton and Princeton, when the fate of the cause trembled in the balance, his effective strength was less than 4,000.

(3) A careful study of the conduct of the regular or Continental troops throughout the Revolution will abundantly demonstrate that a standing army is one of the least dangers to which American freedom can be exposed. (4) The fear of "militarism" caused the wise plan suggested by Greene (5) and the reiterated recommendations of Washington to go unheeded and, as a logical consequence, our first war was attended by an extravagance in men and money utterly unjustifiable. Of regulars or Continental troops 231,771 (6) and no less than 164,087 militia (7) saw service, a total of 395,858, whereas the entire British force from first to last was only about 150,605 (8)__in other words the Americans used nearly three men to their enemy's one. The war cost the United States $370,000,000, (9) and pensions to the amount of $70,000,000 have been paid in consequence of it. (10)

Unflattering though it be to American pride, it is none the less true that, notwithstanding our employment of over 395,000 men, only two military events had a direct bearing upon the ultimate expulsion of the British. The first was the capture of Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777, the second the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781__and the latter was only rendered possible by the timely assistance of a French army and a French fleet. (11)

From a military standpoint the errors in the policy followed during the Revolution may be summarized under twelve headings, namely:

(1) The total inability to comprehend that the military resources can only be utilized to best advantage by a central government to which the entire nation owes paramount allegiance, and that any delegation of that power to the States must obviously weaken the national military strength and correspondingly increase the national expenditures;

(2) the failure to realize that, in a military system which combines the use of regulars and volunteers or militia, men in the absence of compulsion or strong inducement will invariably enlist in the organization most lax in discipline;

(3) the enlisting of troops for too short periods of service;

(4) entirely too great dependence placed upon militia, instead of

(5) maintaining an adequate force of trained officers and soldiers; the substituting for the armies in the field, and the increasing of them by new and untrained organizations in place of keeping the former up to their full strength at all times;

(6) the pernicious use of bounties, both State and National__the logical result of short enlistments, the dearth of proper provisions for recruiting, and the failure to recruit "for the war" only;

(7) the depriving of organizations of their officers by detailing them on detached duty, owing to the failure to provide the requisite number of officers for staff duty, recruiting, etc.:

(8) the neglect to make full use of drafting when all other methods had failed to obtain the men needed;

(9) the enormously increased expense caused by the unnecessarily large number of troops under pay, the wanton waste resulting from lack of discipline and the heavy losses from sickness which is inevitable among raw troops;

(10) the needless protraction of the war owing to the inefficiency of the troops employed:

(11) the absolute lack of a definite military policy by Congress at any time during the war__the consequent inability of the commander-in-chief to formulate any sound plan of campaign and the necessity of resorting to inadequate and costly makeshifts;

(12) unnecessary increase in the pension list." (12)

FOOTNOTES ON CHAPTER III THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION: PAGES: 40-42 LESSON OF THE REVOLUTION

1. 1776.

2. See above, page 19.

3. Page 19.

4. Upton, p. 61. Compare Washington's declarations, pp. 17 and 570, footnote 178.

5. See above, page 9, footnote.

6. Returns and estimates of the Secretary of War; American State Papers, I, pp. 14-19; Upton, p.58.

The number of soldiers furnished to the Continental Army during the Revolution was as follows:

Massachusetts (67,907)
Connecticut (31,939)
Virginia (26,678)
Pennsylvania (25,678)
New York (17,781)
Maryland (13,912)
New Hampshire (12,497)
New Jersey (10,726)
North Carolina (7,263)
South Carolina (6,417)
Rhode Island (5,908)
Georgia (2,679)
Delaware (2,386)

Total: 231,771

In the figures given by Carrington, p. 653, Massachusetts is stated as having furnished 69,907, so that his total is 233,771

7. American State Papers, I, pp. 14-19; Upton, p.58.

8. Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by Carrington, pp. 93, 301, 321, 462, 483, 502 and 646.

9. Upton, p. 66; Ingersoll, The Second War, I, p. 14. The cost per capita was $123 as against $96 for the War of the Rebellion.

10. Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1913, p.9. His report for 1914 does not mention this item.

11. Upton, p. 59.

12. Upton, pp. 66-67; Carrington, pp. 647-656; Huidekoper, Is The United States Prepared for War? p.21, North American Review for February and March, 1906, and republished, in May, 1907, in pamphlet form, with an introduction by Hon. William H. Taft.