Chapter V  Pages: 54-55

With the outbreak of war came the cry throughout the country of "On to Canada," and General Hull with a mixed force of regulars and volunteers and militia crossed the Ste. Marie River from Detroit (11) in July, but soon withdrew and permitted the British to invest them in Detroit.

At the end of eight days the entire American garrison, (12) without so much as firing a shot, surrendered to a force numbering about 320 regulars, 400 militia and 600 Indians. (13) Within a month the control of the entire Northwest was lost and the initiative passed to the enemy, who was promptly joined by nearly all the Indians in that region.

The ignominious fiasco of Hull served only to stiffen the American determination to expel the British, to invade Canada and to punish the Indian tribes in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. One expedition of 4,000 Kentucky mounted militia under General Hopkins started from Fort Harrison, Indiana, on October 14th, for the Wabash and Illinois Rivers, but five days later the troops mutinied, deserted their officers and dispersed to their homes. (14) A Similar fate attended the expedition to the rapids of the Maumee River under General William Henry Harrison during the same month. (15)

The operations on Niagara frontier were equally unsuccessful. A sorry body of New York militia under General Van Rensselaer (16) was re-enforced by 900 regulars and additional militia, under General Wadsworth, (17) attacked the British at Queenstown on October 13th and got a sound beating, (18) the militia__except one detachment__mutinying and refusing to cross the river to
the support of the troops already on the other side who successfully stormed and captured the enemy's batteries. (19) Nearly seven weeks later (20) a second attempt was made to invade Canada by a force of 4,500 under General Smyth who, notwithstanding a bombastic proclamation, (21) lost heart and ordered the troops already embarked back to the American side. A second embarkation (22) three days later was likewise recalled and the expedition abandoned, much to the anger of the troops who had at first been opposed to the invasion. (23)

Meanwhile a force of 5,737 troops under General Dearborn had been assembled in the vicinity of Lake Champlain for the purpose of invading Canada by way of Montreal. In November the advance began but, upon reaching the frontier, "of the 3,000 militia...nearly all refused to cross the line...but halted at the very border." (24) A reconnaissance to the La Colle River and the capture of a block-house constituted the extent of its exploits which ended in winter quarters. (25)

Such were the achievements of the American forces, which numbered not less than 65,000 men, (26) in the face of an enemy never estimated to exceed 1,450 (27) and in reality even less. (28) The utter worthlessness of the new system inaugurated by the pernicious Act of 1792 (29) was demonstrated in the succession of failures and disasters which characterized this campaign.(30)

FOOTNOTES (11-30) ON CHAPTER V THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812 Pages: 54-55

11. On the march from Urbana, Ohio, to Detroit, part of Hull's militia mutinied and the 4th United States Infantry had to be employed to bring them to order. Upon reaching Detroit, 180 Ohio militia mutinied and refused to cross the river, "alleging as a reason that they were not obliged to serve outside of the United States."__Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812, pp. 34-35.

12. About 300 regulars and 1,500 volunteers and militia.

13. Upton, p. 98. How much value the enemy placed upon the militia is evinced by the fact that they were allowed to return home, whereas the 320 regulars were sent to Montreal as prisoners.

14. "As illustrating the reckless extravagance with which hostilities were carried on, one of the expeditions, set on foot for this purpose, deserves special mention. It was commanded by General Hopkins and consisted of 4,000 Kentucky mounted militia, who reached Fort Harrison [Note. About 2 miles from the present city of Terre Haute, Ind.] on the 10th of October, whence
four days later they set out for the Indian villages on the Wabash and Illinois Rivers. Once on the march the ardor of these troops began to cool and insubordination quickly followed; on the fourth day a fire on the prairie was mistaken for a ruse of the enemy; on the fifth day, totally ignoring the authority of their officers, the disorderly mass abandoned their general, and retracing their steps, dispersed to their homes."__Upton, p.99.

15. "While these movements against the Indians were going on, preparations were made for collecting another army under General William Henry Harrison for the special purpose of effacing the stain of Hull's surrender. To this end volunteers, and more especially militia, came forward with the greatest enthusiasm and offered themselves in such numbers that it became necessary to decline the services of the larger part, who returned to their homes grievously disappointed.

"The militia of Kentucky and Tennessee assembled at Louisville and at Newport; those from Virginia, at Urbana; those of Pennsylvania, at Erie. From these several points the troops were organized into three columns with a supposed total of not less than 10,000 men. Their first destination was the Rapids of the Maumee, a point that was not reached in this year's campaign,
for no sooner had the several columns moved, than hunger, nakedness, and mutiny began the work of dissolution. The left column from Kentucky, when a few days out, was only prevailed upon to remain by the personal entreaties of the general and other officers. The middle column from Urbana, after a slight engagement with the Indians, refused to obey orders for a further pursuit, and deliberately returned to their camp. This ended the autumn campaign, though Harrison was not willing to acknowledge its failure, and proposed to continue operations by means of a winter expedition which led soon after to a painful defeat."__Ibid.

16. 691 men according to the returns of September 1st, "many of them without shoes and all clamorous for pay."__Van Rensselaer, Affair of Queenstown, p.10.

17. The force in the vicinity of Lewistown and Fort Niagara numbered on October 12th, 900 regulars and 2,270 militia.__Returns quoted in Wilkinson's Memoirs, 1, p. 580. Even the regulars were comparatively raw troops.

18. 160 regulars and 90 militia killed and wounded, and 700 captured.__Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.

The British, who numbered 600 regulars and 500 militia and Indians, lost only 69 killed and 69 wounded.__James, I, p. 97.

19. Van Rensselaer, P.10, and Appendix, p.62; Armstrong, Notices of the War of 1812, II, pp. 100-107, and Appendix No. 12, pp. 207, 219.

20. November 28th, 1812.

21. James, I, pp. 391-392; Thompson, Late War, p. 82.

22. From Black Rock, N.Y.

23. Upton, pp. 103-104; Thompson, p.87

24. Ingersoll, The Second War, I, p. 101.

25. Upton, pp. 104-105.

26. The militia numbered 49,187, Masschusetts furnishing 208 and Connecticut none. The regulars amounted to 15,000.__Records of the Adjutant-General's Office, and Upton, p. 105.

27. James, I, p.56

28. General Brown, subsequently the British commander-in-chief, in a letter dated July 20, 1813, estimated the British regulars at less than 1,200 men and asserted that "at no time did the command of this distinguished chief (General Brock) consist of less than one-third of old men and boys, fit only for garrison duty."__Armstrong, I, p. 224.

29. Pages 48-49.

30. "Instead of relying upon a small but well-disciplined regular establishment, this law entrusted the safety and honor of a nation to armies of militia supported by the several States during the long intervals of peace. These armies, though elaborately organized on paper into battalions, brigades, and divisions, were only to receive such drill and instruction as the various States might think proper....

"Led to a certain extent by those who had gained actual military experience during the Revolution or on the Indian frontier, endowed with perhaps more average intelligence and education than the regulars; supplied with the same food, clothing, and equipments as they were, the marked inferiority of the militia troops was largely due to the brief period of their service, to the conviction that their time would soon be 'out,' and that others must take their places and bear the burdens and dangers of the contest.

"While their pay was no greater than that of other troops, when we deduct the time lost in coming and going, as well as that consumed in partial and unavailing instruction, their real cost to the country was infinitely greater."__Upton, pp. 105-106.