Chapter II (Continue) Pages 27-33

As in the previous years, 1780 witnessed a diminution in the number of enlistments (130) and the increase in the size of the bounties offered, New Jersey paying $1,000 in excess of the continental allowances. The depreciation in the currency (131) caused the utmost distress among the officers, (132) but Congress confined itself to reiterating (133) its previous resolution (134) that they be offered half-pay for life to remain in service until the close of the war.

 Notwithstanding an almost uninterrupted succession of defeats, and the urgent need for more and better troops, Congress resolved on a reduction of the army to take effect the first of January following. (135) This was quite in keeping with the unwise legislation which made no attempt to check the corruption among Government agents that had arisen as a result of increasing prices and commissions, (136) which legalized violence and expose unprotected persons to cruelty and outrage until the summary execution of soldiers without trial, even by order of Washington, the plundering of citizens and the seizure of their property without payment became matters of frequent occurrence. (137) The States likewise took a hand in legislation and, toward the close of the war, the seizure of supplies for the army was made a penal offence by more than one of them, quite regardless of national welfare and the detriment to the land forces. (138)

After a bitter experience of five years of war, during which he had had ample opportunity to test fully the military policy pursued by Congress, Washington laid bare its follies and inadequacy in a letter to the President of that body, dated August 20, 1780, in which he declared that:

"it is the true policy of America not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to Endeavour, if possible, to give consistence and solidity to her measures....(139). Experience has shown that a peremptory draft will be the only effectual one .... To one, who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description, and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a change. It may be easily shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause.

"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy; destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak, as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force, which the country was completely able to afford; and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause.

"Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war, and the paper emissions, have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had, a great part of the timer, two sets of men to feed and pay, the discharged men going home and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776.

The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present levies we find there are some who have received a hundred and fifty dollars in specie for five months' service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that, by the time they have taught those men the rudiments of a soldier's duty, their service will have expired, and the work recommence with a new set. The consumption of provision, arms, accoutrements, and stores of every kind, has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impracticable. No person, who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs, can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments, than it would have done otherwise.

"There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since.

"If the army is left in its present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put upon a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect, and nothing, I believe, will tend more to give us peace the ensuing winter. It will be an interesting winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favorable terms in forcible language; an army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, and crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim, that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war." (140)

Nearly four weeks later (141) the commander-in-chief, in writing to the President of Congress about General Gates' defeat at Camden, summed up the whole question in a nutshell by declaring that:

"This event, however, adds itself to many others, to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. REGULAR TROOPS ALONE ARE EQUAL TO THE EXIGENCIES OF MODERN WAR, AS WELL FOR DEFENSE AS OFFENCE; AND WHENEVER A SUBSTITUTE IS ATTEMPTED, IT MUST PROVE ILLUSORY AND RUINOUS. NO MILITIA WILL EVER ACQUIRE THE HABITS NECESSARY TO RESIST A REGULAR FORCE...THE FIRMNESS REQUISITE FOR THE REAL BUSINESS OF FIGHTING IS ONLY TO BE ATTAINED BY A CONSTANT COURSE OF DISCIPLINE AND SERVICE. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion; and IT IS MOST EARNESTLY TO BE WISHED, THAT THE LIBERTIES OF AMERICA MAY NO LONGER BE TRUSTED, IN ANY MATERIAL DEGREE, TO SO PRECARIOUS A DEPENDENCE." (142)

The Campaign of 1780 was virtually a repetition of the experiences of 1775 and 1776. Clinton's voyage from New York (143) was beset with storms and it was not until February 11th that his troops were landed on St. John's Island, 30 miles below Charleston. After a delay of six weeks, (144) the city was invested (145) and a siege, (146) ending on May 12th, resulted in the capitulation of General Lincoln, the garrison (147) and all the male inhabitants of Charleston (148) upon honorable terms. (149) Within a month General Clinton returned to New York, (150) leaving Lord Cornwallis in command, and that officer promptly set to work to reduce South Carolina to submission, but encountered considerable resistance in the partisan warfare waged by Colonels Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion, (151) seconded by a small force under Baron de Kalb. (152) On July 25th, General Gates (153) arrived, assumed command (154) and set "the Grand Army", as he termed it, in motion for Camden, South Carolina, where on August 16th, notwithstanding his superiority in numbers, (155) he was overwhelmingly defeated by Cornwallis. (156) Some of the militia ran away in the most disgraceful manner* while Gates himself covered 180 miles in four days, reaching Hillsborough, North Carolina, on the 20th, "without gathering a sufficient force of the fugitives to form even an escort." (157) Cornwallis promptly followed up his victory, and on the 18th Colonel Tarleton nearly annihilated Sumter's force at Fishing Creek. (158) South Carolina had been completely subjugated and the British commander addressed himself to the invasion of North Carolina but, on October 7th, one of his detachments under Major Fergusson (159) was surprised at King's Mountain by a force of American volunteers (160) and defeated with heavy loss. (161) Marion and Sumter continued to harass the enemy until the latter was disabled by a wound. (162) Cornwallis, realizing that he had not adopted the best method of invasion, went into winter quarters at Winnsborough, North Carolina, and the interest in the southern theatre of war terminates with the arrival on December 3rd of General Greene, who superseded Gates in command of a sorry force of less than 2,400 men. (163)
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*disgraceful manner: General Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States, I, pp. 178-183; Tarleton, Campaign in North Carolina, pp. 106-109.

The culprits were the brigades of Virginia and South Carolina militia. The only regiment out of these two commands which did not behave in this ignominious fashion was composed of North Carolinians under Colonel Dixon and greatly distinguished itself. It was apropos of them that General Henry Lee wrote in his memoirs (I, p.97) that "A GOVERNMENT IS THE MURDERER OF ITS CITIZENS WHICH SENDS THEM TO THE FIELD UNINFORMED AND UNTAUGHT, WHERE THEY ARE TO MEET MEN OF THE SAME AGE AND STRENGTH, MECHANIZED BY EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE FOR BATTLE."
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In the North, the winter of 1779-1780 had been unusually severe and the army at Morristown suffered correspondingly. (164) Washington, harassed beyond endurance by the dearth of supplies, the absence of money to pay the troops (165), whose disgust and desperation culminated in mutiny (166) and by the inability to lend assistance in the South so long as a superior force of British, (167) supported by a fleet, remained in occupation of New York, began to despair of the result. (168) A gleam of hope was received upon the arrival of Lafayette (169) with the news that the Comte de Rochambeau was coming with a large army and that the first division was already en route; but the month of June witnessed two invasions of New Jersey by the British, (170) merely for the purpose of keeping the Americans occupied.

 On July 10th, Rochambeau arrived at Newport with 6,000 troops and Washington proposed the capture of New York, but three days later Admiral Graves reached there, thus giving the British fleet a decided superiority, and the enterprise had to be postponed until the arrival of the second French division. (171) Clinton retorted by an expedition destined to operate against Rhode Island and 8,000 troops were sent forward to Huntington, Long Island, but Washington's prompt movement and information as to Rochambeau's strength caused him to relinquish his project and to confine himself to blockading Newport with his fleet. (172) This ended the important operations for the year, although mention must be made of the capture and execution of Major Andre, (173) the attempted betrayal of West Point and the flight of Benedict Arnold, (174) and the declaration of war against Holland by Great Britain on December 2nd. The French second division, reported as blockaded in Brest, did not arrive; the American army rapidly dwindled as the cold weather approached; and on November 28th Washington announced the winter quarters for his troops, selecting New Windsor, New Jersey, for his own (175) and being compelled to discharge the militia for fear the entire army would disband. (176)

Thus terminated a campaign during which the United States had over 43,000 men under arms (177) and won only one victory of any consequence.

FOOTNOTES ON CHAPTER II THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION: PAGES: 27-33 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1780

130. The States were required to furnish 80 battalions amounting to 41, 760 men; the number enlisted was only 26,826.__American State Papers, and Upton, p.47.

131. In April, May, June, and July, 1780, paper currency stood at sixty as compared with specie; in November it reached one hundred. In May, 1781, it ceased to circulate entirely. "When this fatal result could no longer be averted, Congress, in March, 1780, tried to set on foot a new scheme of finance and with five millions of specie sought to redeem, at the rate of forty to one, the two hundred millions of currency which represented the labor and privations of a patriotic people during five years of war."__Upton, p.50.

132. "In 1780 the cost of a hat was $400, a suit of clothes $1,600, while the year's pay of a captain would not buy a pair of shoes."__Upton, p.51.

133. October 21st.

134. Passed August 17, 1779. See above, p.25.

135. On the reduced footing contemplated, the Army was to consist of 49 regiments of infantry, 4 of cavalry, 4 of artillery, and one of artificers. The quotas assigned to the various States need not be set forth here; they will be found in Upton, p.48.

136. The plundering of the national Treasury__alluded to in footnote 71, progressed to such an extent that Congress authorized, in July, 1779, the States to scrutinize and in case of misbehavior to discharge persons in the departments of the Quartermaster or Commissary General. This step was one of those leading to the reorganization of the Quartermaster's department in July, 1780. "The new system was adopted in opposition to the report of a Congressional committee which had perfected a plan after full consultation with Washington and Greene. It established no check to corruption, but rather increased it by recognizing the paramount authority of the States, under the Confederation, in every matter pertaining to the supply of men and means for the prosecution of the war."__Upton, p.51.

137. Congress, seeing that its credit was diminishing owing to the extent to which paper currency had been emitted, endeavored to replenish the Treasury through the medium of taxes levied by the States, but, when these failed to produce the desired result, it had no other alternative than to requisition from the States the supplies actually needed. The responsibility was thus shifted to the States and their credit with the people was but little stronger than that of Congress. Within a short time public faith both in Continental and State currencies had vanished, and people refused to part with their property for valueless money. It then became necessary to resort to forcible impressments, which was sanctioned by Congressional resolution and State laws.

When dictatorial powers were first conferred upon Washington in 1776 (see footnote 56) he was authorized "to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the Army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same," and he was additionally empowered to arrest and confine any person refusing to accept Continental money or disaffected toward the American cause. In the second grant of dictatorial powers in 1777 (see page 20) he was authorized within a distance of 70 miles from his headquarters "to take, wherever he may be, all such provisions and other articles as may be necessary for the comfortable subsistence of the army under his command, paying or giving certificates for the same."

Aside from the manifest injustice of these impressment laws, they exercised a pernicious influence upon the discipline of the troops who often yielded to the temptation to plunder in the most outrageous fashion. To protect the lives and property of the inhabitants, the officers had no alternative except to inflict illegal and summary punishment, a course which Washington was obliged to sanction in order to put an effectual check to the licentiousness indulged in by the soldiers.

Vide Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, II, pp. 207-208, and Upton, pp. 52-53.

138. Upton, p.53

139. A statement as true today as it was then.

140. Sparks, VII, pp. 162-165.

141. On September 15th.

142. Sparks, VII, pp. 205-206.

143. See above, p.27

144. It was not until March 12th that the British established themselves across the narrow neck between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, but Clinton deferred action until he had been joined by General Patterson and 1,400 men from Savannah.

145. On the night of April first.

146. On April 18th, Lord Cornwallis arrived from New York with 3,000 troops to re-enforce Clinton.

147.2,200 regulars and 1,000 militia are the figures quoted by Carrington, p. 404. Lossing does not give its strength.

148. The schedule made by Deputy Adjutant-General John Andre enumerates 5,618 prisoners.

149. Carrington, pp. 493-497; Lossing, II, pp. 762-767.

150. On June 5th.

151. Carrington, pp. 506-509.

152. This force, numbering 1,400, had left Morristown, N.J., on April 16th going by water to Petersburg, Va., and reaching Buffalo Ford and Deep River, N.C., on July 6th.

153. The victor of Saratoga. See above, p.20.

154. "On the thirteenth of June, Congress, without consulting Washington, appointed General Gates to the command of the Southern Department. He had spent the winter at his home in Virginia, but eagerly accepted this high command. His old confidant and companion in arms, Charles Lee, sententiously forewarned him on his departure: "Take care that you do not exchange northern laurels for southern willows."__Carrington, p. 492.

155. The British numbered 2,239 men, according to Cornwallis' report, while the American returns made the night before the battle showed a force of only 3,052, a fact of which General Gates was in total ignorance until that moment.

156. Cornwallis reported his losses as 324 killed, wounded and missing. The exact loss of the Americans was never ascertained but, so far as can be estimated, it consisted of 736 officers and men, 1,000 prisoners, 8 field pieces, 2,000 muskets and the entire baggage train. Generals de Kalb, Gregory, and Rutherford were killed.__Carrington, pp. 517-518; Lossing, II, p. 673, and footnote 2 on p.674.

157. Carrington, p.517.

158. Out of 400 men, Sumter had 50 killed and 300 captured.__carrington, pp. 511, 512 and 518; Lossing, II, p.660.

159. Composed of 1,125 men.__Lossing, II, p.634.

160. Numbering about 1,600 men.

161. Carrington, pp. 520-521; Lossing, II, pp. 631-635.

162. At Blackstock's plantation, on the Tiger River, November 20th.

163. "The remnants of General Gates' army were being re-organized as rapidly as possible, and before the departure of that officer to answer before a Court of Inquiry ordered by Congress, as to the disaster of Camden, he had collected a nominal force of two thousand three hundred and seven men, more than half of whom were militia, and as afterwards stated by General Greene, 'but eight hundred in the whole force were properly clothed and equipped.'"__Carrington, p.522.

164. Carrington, pp. 486-488.

165. "The soldiers had not been paid for five months; their families were suffering; recruiting was almost suspended."___Carrington, p. 488.

166. "on the twenty-fifth of May two Connecticut regiments mutinied, declaring that they would march home," or at least gain subsistence by the point of the bayonet.'"__Ibid., p. 491.

167. According to the original returns in the British Record Office, the English had 17,324 effective troops in New York on May 1, 1780. At the beginning of April, Washington's force amounted "to only 10,400 rank and file," of which about 2,800 had but four weeks longer to serve.__Washington to the President of Congress, April 2, 1780. Sparks, VI, p.6.

168. In a letter to Joseph Jones, dated Morristown, 31 May, 1780, Washington set forth some plain truths about the prevailing conditions:

"Certain I am, unless Congress speaks in a more decisive tone, unless they are vested with powers by the several States competent to the great purposes of war, or assume them as matter of right, and they and the States respectively act with more energy than they hitherto have done that our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge on in the old way. By ill timing the adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit from them. One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill; and while such a system as the present one or rather want of one prevails, we shall ever be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage.

"...I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen, which, instead of looking up to Congress themselves as dependent on their respective States. In a word, I see the powers of Congress declining too fast for the consideration and respect, which are due to them as the great representative body of America, and I am fearful of the consequences."___Sparks, VII, pp. 67-68.

169. On May 12th.

170. On June 6th by General Knyphausen, and on the 21st by Clinton.

171. Carrington, p.504.

172. Carrington, p. 523.

173. On September 23rd, and October 2nd, respectively.

174. September 25th.

175. Washington to the President of Congress, November 28, 1780.__Sparks, VII, pp. 313-315.

176. Washington to General Greene, December 13,__Sparks, VII, p. 321.

177. 21,015 Continentals and 22,061 militia, a total of 42,076.__American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. I; Upton, pp. 47-48.

As has already been seen (footnote 130) the men furnished to the Continental Army were only about half the quotas required. It is also noteworthy that the militia, the majority of which was used in the South__outnumbered the regulars, and that the total of the troops, under arms was slightly over 1,000 more than the number furnished during 1779.