Chapter II (Continue) Pages 19-21

After a victory at Princeton on January 3rd, Washington's army took up its winter quarters at Morristown, its strength on March 14th being "under 3,000," (57) while the British had more than 20,000 veterans in the vicinity of New York. The operations ending in June, when the enemy evacuated New Jersey, were little more than skirmishes, since Washington did not dare to give or receive battle. (58)

The Army was in a sorry plight and payments were made in paper money, which rapidly depreciated. Again Congress resorted to raw levies, (59) found itself greatly embarrassed by the bounty system which it had inaugurated, (60) was obliged to introduce territorial recruitment (61) and to grant dictatorial powers to Washington for a second time. (62) So apparent did the insufficiency of Congressional measures (63) become that, before the year was out, Virginia and Massachusetts had to set the the example of drafting a method which Washington recommended to the President of Pennsylvania as the only certain way of obtaining Continental troops. (64)

The arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, who was commissioned a Major General on July 31st, afforded the struggling colonies some temporary encouragement, but early in that month General Howe transported the British forces at New York 65 to the Chesapeake and, moving north, reached Elkton, 54 miles from Philadelphia, on August 28th. On September 11th Washington was defeated at the battle of the Brandywine, (66) and sixteen days later Howe occupied Philadelphia. On October 4th he endeavored to surprise the camp at Germantown, but without success, and after some minor actions withdrew to winter quarters at Valley Forge. (67) Meanwhile a splendid success had crowned the American arms at Saratoga, where Burgoyne and his force (68) surrendered to General Gates (69) on October 17th, (70) but the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union creating the United States of America, which had been in force since July but were not definitely agreed upon until November 15th, did not augur well for the future from a military standpoint since:

"instead of resting the war power in a central government, which alone could insure its vigorous exercise, Congress was reduced to a mere consultative body or congress of diplomats, with authority to concert only such measures for common defense as might receive the sanction of the allied sovereignties they represented. (71)

"Weak as had been our military policy under the government of the Continental Congress, it was to become still more imbecile through the inherent defects of the new system. To the indecision and delays of a single Congress were now superadded the indecisions and delays of at least nine more deliberative bodies." (72)

Small wonder that in spite of the employment of 34, 820 Continentals and at least 33, 900 militia, a total of 68,720, (73) the results achieved during 1777 should have been so meager, and the straits to which Washington and his slender force of half-clad, half-starved men at Valley Forge were reduced were an indelible blot upon American history.

FOOTNOTES ON CHAPTER II THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION: PAGES: 19-21 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1777

57. Washington's report of that date emphasized the fact that only 981 were regulars and that the terms of service of the militia would expire on March 31st.

58. By May 24th, his force had been increased to 7,500.

59. On July 28th, Congress recommended to the Executive Council of Pennsylvania "to call out 4,000 militia in addition to those already called forth," and on August 24th it "urgently recommended to the State of Maryland to immediately call out not less than 2,000 select militia to repel the invasion of the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware." It likewise requested Pennsylvania to furnish the army with 4,000 and Delaware with 1,000 militia, and eight counties in Virginia near Chesapeake Bay were asked to contribute one-third of their forces. These urgent calls produced exactly one small brigade of militia for the army at the Brandywine.

60. "Early in the year delegates from the New England States, which met for consultation in regard tot heir joint interests at Providence, recommended that the States represented should add a bounty of thirty-three and one-third dollars to the Continental bounty of $20 already authorized for the 88 battalions created in 1776. Massachusetts and New Hampshire doubled this extra bounty, making a total of eighty-six and two-thirds dollars for each recruit. Thus within a year the bounty had become more than twenty-fold greater.

"This increase at once put a stop to re-enlistments in the old regiments, as the men naturally went home to secure the State bounty, and would not take the smaller sum offered by Congress. Further than this, the large State bounties shook the allegiance of the soldier to his colors." Desertions became so numerous that on April 6th, Washington had to issue a proclamation "offering free pardon to all...who shall voluntarily surrender themselves to any officer of the Continental Army or join their respective corps before the 15th day of May next."__Upton, p.28.

61. On July 31st, Congress recommended "the executive authorities of the United States to divide their respective States into districts and to appoint a proper person in each district to fill up the regiments.."

"It also recommended that the legislative authorities should designate in their respective States convenient places of rendezvous for recruits and deserters..."

"This division of States into districts and establishments of rendezvous or depots, had some analogy to the territorial distribution and recruitment of troops now adopted by every European nation."__Upton, p.28.

62. September 17, 1777.

63. "To stimulate recruiting. Congress on the 14th of April recommended that each State legislature "enact laws exempting from actual service any two of the militia who should, within the time limited by such laws, furnish one able-bodied recruit to serve in any battalion of the Continental Army for three years or during the war; said exemption to continue during the term of enlistment, the recruit to have the Continental bounty and other allowances.'

"It is also recommended 'that State legislatures enact laws compelling all such persons as are by laws exempted from bearing arms or performing military duties, other than such as are specified in the foregoing resolution, to furnish such number of able-bodied soldiers as said legislature shall deem a proper equivalent for such exemption; such soldiers to be entitled to the Continental bounty and other allowances over and above such gratuities as they may receive from those who procure them to enlist.'"

In other words, the Government, although not ready to recommend a draft, took a step in that direction by obligating certain individuals__not States__to furnish a certain number of troops._Upton, pp. 27-28.

64.Washington to Thomas Wharton, October 17, 1777. Sparks, V, pp. 95-97.

65. Approximately 18,000 men.__Carrington, p. 366; Fiske, I, p.309.

66. "The nominal strength of the American army...was fourteen thousand men, but the effective force did not exceed eleven thousand."___Carrington, p.366.

67. On December 19th. On the 23rd Washington reported that "only 8,200 men were present fit for duty."

68. 5,763 officers and men.

69. According to Gates' report of October 16th, his army numbered 9,093 regulars and 4,123 militia, a total of 13, 216 present for duty. The value of trained troops was demonstrated anew by the success achieved.

More than to any other officer present__Gates included__was the credit for this notable victory due to the gallant Benedict Arnold, then the hero of the American troops.

70. Notwithstanding the attempt to relieve him made by Clinton from New York.__Fiske, I, pp. 334-335; Carrington, pp. 356-361.

An extremely interesting account of the battle of Saratoga is given by Sir Edward Creasy in his Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, pp. 297-324.

71. Each State could, with the assent of Congress, maintain its own army and navy in time of peace, while the power to carry on war was made to depend upon the concurrence of at least nine States. The power "to raise men, and clothe, arm and equip them at the expense of the United States" being relinquished to the several States, the national Treasury was thus placed at the mercy of every State agent. Moreover, since Congress was prohibited form enlisting a soldier, levying a tax or enforcing a requisition for men or money, any legislature could neutralize the power of any other State, "if not defeat the chief object of the Confederation."__Upton, p.32.

72. Ibid.

73. American State Papers, XII, p.15; Upton, p.27.