Chapter II (Continue) Pages 14-17.

Up to January 14, 1776, out of the 20,370 troops authorized by Congress three months before, only 10,500 had been enlisted and many of these had not joined. (28) Washington, despairing of raising the army by voluntary enlistments, wrote to the General Court of Massachusetts on January 16th suggesting the employment of "coercive measures" to maintain the regiments at their proper strength.

 On the same day he proposed to the council of war an attack on the British at Boston before they could be re-enforced and, upon the council of war's agreeing, it was recommended that 13 regiments of militia be called into service until April first. (29) On February 9th, he wrote a remarkable letter to Congress on the subject of the evils, dangers and extravagance of short enlistments, in which he said:

"The disadvantages attending the limited enlistment of troops are too apparent to those who are eyewitnesses of them to render any animadversions necessary, but to gentlemen at a distance whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects the case may be otherwise. That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt, for, had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued to blockade Quebec, a capitulation, from the best accounts I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed..

"The instance of General Montgomery (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced) proves that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration....

"To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination not only requires time, but it is a work of great difficulty, and in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. to EXPECT, then, THE SAME SERVICE FROM RAW AND UNDISCIPLINED RECRUITS AS FROM VETERAN SOLDIERS IS TO EXPECT WHAT NEVER DID AND PERHAPS NEVER WILL HAPPEN..."(30)

Washington, re-enforced by certain militia, occupied Dorchester Heights on March 4th, threw up two redoubts and took steps which brought about the evacuation of Boston by the British on the 17th. (31) Appreciating that New York would be the next objective point, he hastened to send five regiments to its defense and on April 13th arrived there himself with nearly all his army. Congress immediately required him to send four, and later six, additional regiments___3,000 men__to Canada to re-enforce the troops near Quebec. His army, thus scattered and divided, was reduced to 5,300 Continentals, (32) leaving him no alternative except to depend upon militia enlisted for short periods only. Such was the force with which he was expected to confront a disciplined British army numbering from 20,000 to 30,000.

Congress at last awoke to the gravity of the situation in June, called out 6,000 militia to re-enforce the troops in Canada, (33) authorized 13,800 to strengthen Washington, (34) and created a "flying camp" to be located in New Jersey; (35) but in spite of Washington's reiterated recommendations, the enlistments of all these troops was to expire on December first. As General Upton aptly remarks, (36)

"The slow increase of the Continental Army shows that Congress was committed to a dual military establishment, one class of troops being Continental or regular, the other militia. In the former the gradual extension of enlistments to two and three years enabled the men to acquire the discipline which ultimately proved the salvation of our cause. The natural disposition of men to seek the easiest and shortest service prompted them to enlist in the militia in preference to the Continental regiments, and thus the only force which could be depended upon to cope with the British, both offensively and defensively, was always from one-third to one-half below its prescribed strength."

On July 4th (37) the Declaration of Independence was adopted and the time for speedy action in expelling the British had come, but the lesson that raw troops cannot prevail against disciplined regulars had apparently not been learned. On August 27th was fought the battle of Long Island between Lord Howe's force of fully 20,000 men (38) and about 8,000 under Washington, all that he could muster out of an army whose paper strength was 27,000. (39) The logical result followed; the Americans were badly beaten and on the 30th retreated to New York, (40) where Washington wrote on September 2nd to the President of Congress that:

"no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency for exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which when effected are not attended with any good consequences." (41)

On September 15th the British occupied New York, after a spirited engagement ending in the retreat of the Americans to Harlem Heights, the brigades of Parsons and Fellows running away in the most disgraceful fashion. (42) On the 24th Washington wrote some plain truths to the President of Congress, declaring that:

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff." Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.

"Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodgings, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others.* Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control can not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of sub-ordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year.... Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 to 100,000 in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia.* The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause." (43)

The bugbear of militarism which had already taken possession of Congress, Washington dismissed by continuing thus:

"The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote, and, in my judgment, situated as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon days later. Howe then resumed the offensive in New Jersey, and by December 8th not an American soldier remained in the State, Washington, with his army reduced to 3,305, (50) being "powerless to make even a show of resistance, while the militia and other troops of the flying camp were disbanding." (51) On the 26th he surprised the Hessians at Trenton, captured about 1,000, losing only five men himself, (52) and two days later occupied the town.

With the exception of the repulse of the British under Clinton at Fort Moultrie, Charleston, South Carolina, on June 28th this brilliant action at Trenton was the only victory of which the Americans could boast during 1776, notwithstanding 46,901 Continental or Regular troops and 42,760 militia, a total of 89,661, were called out during the year (53) to oppose a British force which never equaled half that number. (54) Congress in its alarm over the almost total dissolution of the army, the rapid advance of the British through New Jersey and the capture of the capital, Philadelphia, which was momentarily expected, not only voted an increase of 110 battalions, (55) but vested in Washington complete power for a period of six months to raise 16 additional battalions of infantry, 3,000 light horse, 3 regiments of artillery and a corps of engineers, as well as certain other extraordinary authority. (56) That the sovereign body was willing__indeed eager__ to pass a resolution so fraught with danger to the future liberties of the States and to clothe even a Washington with the absolute power of a dictator affords ample proof that the blundering policy pursued since the beginning of the Revolution was recognized after nearly two years to be utterly inadequate and worthless under the stress of military crisis.

"On September 5, 1776, General Knox wrote to his wife:


"It is Misfortune that must raise us to the character of a great people. We must have a standing army. The militia get sick, or think themselves so, and run home." The Centennial of the United States Military Academy, I, pp. 201-202.

General Greene, next to Washington the most distinguished officer in the army, wrote on October 28, 1776, to a friend:

"There must be a good army established: men engaged for the war; a proper corps of officers...The Congress goes upon a penurious plan."___Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, I, p. 221.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II (War of the Revolution) The Campaign of 1776

28. Upton, p. 10.

29. Sparks, III, pp. 246-247, and footnote, pp. 253-254

30. Sparks, III, pp. 278-279.

31. "During these operations the militia of the neighborhood were called in for the short space of three days."__Upton, p. 12.

32. "During the first half of 1776 the Continental Army was increased piecemeal. January 4, 10, and 16, an additional battalion was authorized from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and North Carolina, respectively; January 14, 4 battalions were called for from New York; March 25, 2 battalions were authorized in South Carolina; May 16, 2 battalions were called for from Massachusetts and Connecticut, respectively, with a term of enlistment for two years, provided the men would consent; May 18, a regiment of rifles was authorized from Virginia; July 24, the regiment of South Carolina Rangers was taken into the Continental establishment; June 27, a regiment of rifles was created, partly composed of independent companies to be enlisted for three years."__Upton, pp. 12-13.

33. This step, being taken too late, proved futile since the Americans had to evacuate Canada on June 18th.

34. Of these New Jersey was to furnish 3,300, New York 3,000, Connecticut 5,500 and Massachusetts 2,000.

35. This camp was destined for the protection of the middle colonies and was to consist of 10,000 militia, Pennsylvania supplying 6,000, Maryland 3,400 and Delaware 600.
"On the 19th of July the flying camp was further increased by 4 battalions of militia from Pennsylvania, 3 from New Jersey, and 2 battalions of Continentals from Virginia."__Upton, p.12

36. The Military Policy of the United States, p.13.

37. On June 12th, Congress formally appointed a permanent committee, entitled the Board of War and Ordnance, to which all military questions were to be referred and whose functions were similar to those of a Secretary of War.

38. Admiral Howe reported that he landed 15,000 men on August 22nd and a corps of Hessians on the 25th__a total of "upward of twenty thousand" according to Sir George Collier. The total British force amounted to 31,625__24,464 being "effectives fit for duty" as stated by General Clinton in the House of Commons__Carrington, pp.199-200.

39. The official returns of the American army on August 3rd gave a total of 17, 225 but only 10,514 present for duty. On August 26th, its total nominal strength, "including the sick, non-effectives of all kinds, and those without arms, was a little over twenty-seven thousand men." "The force on Long Island at the time of the battle, was not quite eight thousand men, inclusive of Stirling's brigade, which crossed the river in the morning."__Carrington, pp. 196, 197 and 204.

40. Carrington, pp. 207-219; Upton, p. 13.

41. Sparks, IV, P.73; Upton, pp.13-14.

42. Carrington, 220-228; Upton, p.14.

43. Sparks, IV, pp. 113-115.

44. Ibid., IV, pp. 115-116.

45. The resolution of September 16th directed "that 88 battalions be enlisted as soon as possible to serve during the present war." A bounty of $20 was offered to every non-commissioned officer and man so enlisting and land, ranging from 500 acres for a colonel down to 100 acres for non-commissioned officers and soldiers, was promised to all who served until the conclusion of the war. The States were to make original appointments of officers or those to fill vacancies, the actual commissions being issued by Congress. The jealousy and discontent aroused in the Continental troops during the previous year by the same system were thus perpetuated."__Upton, p.17.

46. On November 21st, Congress authorized the States to enlist men "for three years," but timidly volunteered the opinion that it would be to the advantage of the service if the enlistments were for the period "during the war."

47. no less than seven resolutions were devoted to bounties, viz: those of January 19th, June 26th, July 16th, September 16th, October 8th, October 30th, and November 12th. The bounties were doubled between January and July, and again doubled on September 16th.

48. "If, in the days of the Revolution, an officer's promotion could not be urged even by a Washington, it is worthy of remark that with certain State governors, during the War of the Rebellion, the combined recommendations of division, corps, and army commanders were powerless to influence the advancement of officers of known skill and ability."__Upton, p.18.

49. The American force, which had evacuated Montreal on June 18th, (footnote 33) had been followed by a British force under Carleton to Crown Point from which it fell back to Canada on November 2nd. One of Howe's objects was to prevent this body from re-enforcing Washington at New York.

50. The general returns made at Trenton on December 1st showed that Washington's "command consisted of four brigades, including sixteen regiments, and numbered with officers and staff, four thousand three hundred and thirty-four of whom one thousand and twenty-nine were sick, and two-thirds of the sick absent."__Carrington, p.256.

51. Upton, p. 19.

52. Washington's report of December 28, 1776.

53. American State Papers, XIII, p.15, and Upton, p.20.

54. Upton, p.20. C. Stedman, who served on the British General Staff under Howe, Clinton, and Cornwallis, in his History of the Origin, Progress and Termination of the American War, I, p.317, gives the maximum British force during 1776 as 27,700.

55. Recommended by Washington in his letter of December 20, 1776, to the President of Congress (Sparks, IV, pp. 234-235). The 88 battalions voted on September 16th (page 560, footnote 45) were thus augmented by twenty-two.

56. "This Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis, and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigor, and uprightedness of General Washington, do hereby

"Resolve, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, sixteen battalions of infantry, in addition to those already voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of infantry; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand light-horse, three regiments of artillery, and a corps of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places, as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier-general, and to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American Army; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the Army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the Continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and to return to the States, of which they are citizens, their names, and the nature of their offenses, together with the witnesses to prove them. That the foregoing powers be vested in General Washington, for and during the term of six months from the date hereof, unless sooner determined by Congress."