The means by which the truth or
untruth of any relevant fact is
established in the trial of an
action at law. What is and what
is not legal evidence is
determined primarily by the
pleadings in the action. The
early common-law system of
pleading was so devised as to
narrow down all matters of
dispute between the plaintiff
and defendant to a single issue
of law or fact.
If the issue was one of law, a
question was raised for the
court only; but if the issue was
one of fact, a question was
raised for determination by a
common-law jury, after a trial
in which evidence was introduced
on the one side to prove the
alleged fact, and on the other
to disprove it. The whole system
presupposed, on the part of the
jury, inability to consider more
than one issue of fact at a
time, and in the consideration
of that one issue, to some
extent, lack of capacity to give
to different classes of
logically relevant evidence
their proper weight. It is to
the historical development of
the jury system, therefore, that
many rules of the law of
evidence may be attributed,
which now seem to be unwarranted
in logic and unsuited to the
times.
Modern systems of pleading
permit the raising of numerous
issues of fact, and have thus
imposed on the jury duties
requiring a higher standard of
intelligence than under the
ancient system. The rules of
evidence, however, partly
because they have been found to
be practically sufficient, and
partly because of the necessity
of fixed and definite rules in
the branch of the law, have not
undergone a corresponding
change, and many matters of
evidence logically relevant and
of considerable probative force
are still not legally admissible
evidence because of their
supposed tendency to 'confuse
and mislead the jury.'
1. MUST BE RELEVANT:
The rule of first importance in
the law of evidence is that it
must be relevant in order to be
legally admissible. Relevancy
depends directly or indirectly
on the issue raised by the
pleadings. Thus, evidence of a
fact may be relevant because it
tends directly or indirectly to
prove or disprove the fact in
issue that is affirmed by one
side and denied by the other; or
the evidence may be relevant
because it tends to prove or
disprove some matter of evidence
already introduced by the other
side for the purpose of proving
or disproving the issue raised
by the pleadings. But, as has
been pointed out, all logically
relevant evidence is not legal
evidence. Thus evidence which is
logically relevant may not be
legally admissible because:
(a) Its relevancy is
slight or remote. Thus evidence
that the defendant was insolvent
at a certain time is not
admissible to prove that he
borrowed money of the plaintiff
at that time.
(b) The evidence is of
collateral transactions, or (as
is sometimes said) res inter
alios acta. Thus, in an action
to recover damages for
negligence it is not permissible
to show that the defendant was
negligent toward others than the
plaintiff, or on trial of a
defendant for steal, that he
stole from others. The general
rule is, however, subject to
many limitations and
modifications more or less
arbitrary. Thus it is
permissible to show, in an
action of tort, brought to
recover for injuries caused by a
defective appliance belonging to
the defendant, that others were
injured by it in a similar
manner, and generally, value of
land may be shown by proving the
selling price of other land
similarly situated.
A full consideration of these
limitations and modifications is
not within the scope of this
article. So far, however, as
they may be said to rest on any
settled principle, their extent
now depends upon, whether there
is other more available and
satisfactory evidence, and to
some extent upon the discretion
of the trial judge. The
character of a party to a civil
action is not regarded as
relevant, and is, therefore, not
the subject of evidence, unless
the character is directly put in
issue by the pleadings, as in an
action for libel. In a criminal
trial, however, the defendant
may, if he so elects, introduce
evidence of his character, which
evidence the prosecution may
then rebut.
2. HEARSAY. What others
than the witness have said
before the trial is not
generally admissible in evidence
because not sworn to, and
because not subject to
cross-examination. This because
not subject to
cross-examination. This rule,
known as the 'hearsay-evidence
rule,' is subject to several
important exceptions:
a) Admissions and
Confessions:
Statements, either oral or
written, made at any time by a
party to an action or by his
predecessor in interest, may be
introduced in evidence against
him, but not by him or in his
favor. The rule is based upon
the inherent probable truth of
statements which are prejudicial
to the interests of the party
making them. Under the rule as
to predecessor in interest, the
admissions of a deceased person
are admissible in evidence in
actions against his executor, or
admissions as tot he title of
real estate made by its then
owner are admissible in an
action founded upon the title
brought against his subsequent
grantor. Admissions made by an
agent within the scope of his
authority are admissible in
evidence against the principal.
Confessions are strictly
admissions made by one charged
with a crime, and, because of
the necessity of safeguarding
one charged with a crime, are
not admissible when obtained by
means of threats or promises of
favor. This rule has been
extended by statute in many of
the States.
b) Reported Testimony in a
Prior Trial:
In general the testimony of a
witness in an earlier trial
between the same parties and
relating to the same issues, or
between parties identical in
interest with the parties at the
present trial, may be introduced
in evidence if the witness is
dead, insane, unable to attend
the trial, out of the
jurisdiction, or kept from
appearing at the trial by an
opposing party. The testimony in
the earlier trial must have been
sworn to and subject to
cross-examination thus obviating
the usual objection to hearsay
evidence.
C) Dying Declaration:
Declarations made by a person in
extremis are admitted in
evidence upon the trial of one
charged with the crime of
homicide, either in favor of the
prosecution or the prisoner.
d) Admissions Against
Interest:
These should not be confused
with admissions. (See above)
They are admissions in any form
against financial or proprietary
interest of the person making
them and made by one who, at the
time of trial is dead. Unlike
admissions, they need not be
made by one having some
connection with the party to the
action. They must, of course, in
themselves be relevant to
matters in issue at the trial.
Thus an endorsement written on a
note by the holder that a part
of the note is paid, or a book
entry that a bill has been paid,
or a statement that the
declarant is a tenant (rather
than the owner), are all
admissions against financial or
propriety interest, and are
admissible in evidence upon
proper authentication if
relevant, and if the declarant
be dead.
e) Book Entries:
Book entries or reports made
pursuant to a legal duty or in
the usual course of business by
one since deceased having
personal knowledge of the matter
so entered or reported are
admissible in evidence to prove
the truth of matters contained
in the entry. Thus the book
entries of clerks or written
reports of officers are
admissible in evidence under
this head, but not the entries
in a diary, because not made
pursuant to a duty. Closely
related to the rule as to
entries made in the course of
business is the so-called
shop-book rule. This rule varies
considerably in different
jurisdictions, but the effect in
all is substantially to allow a
party to an action, although
present at the trial in person,
to prove an account by
introducing in evidence his book
of account. He is usually
required to make preliminary
proof that he is engaged in the
business in which the charges in
the book are made, and that he
has made correct entries. A
witness may always be allowed to
refresh his memory by referring
to memoranda or book entries; in
that case the memoranda or book
entries are, however, not
directly in evidence, and the
jury may rely only upon the
witness's oral testimony.
(f) Res Gestae:
Any statement made at the time
of the happening of an event by
one who was then present may be
introduced when the event itself
is in issue or relevant. Such
evidence is admitted on the
theory that the statement is
incidental to the event itself,
and to some extent characterizes
or explains it. Thus on the
murder trial of a defendant it
is proper to prove a statement
made at the time of the homicide
by any person present, which
tended to show that the
defendant committed the homicide
or that the act was intentional
or malicious. There are some
other exceptions to the
hearsay-evidence rule, but these
are of infrequent occurrence and
of comparative unimportance, and
do not admit of discussion here.
III REAL EVIDENCE, WRITINGS:
Legal evidence is not limited to
the sworn testimony of
witnesses. Specific objects,
when properly identified by oral
testimony, may often be
introduced in evidence when
their very existence or their
character or appearance tends to
prove or disprove an alleged
fact. Thus models, parts of
machinery, weapons, clothing,
etc. may be introduced in
evidence. Such evidence cannot
of course be submitted to an
appellate court as a part of the
record of the trial, and for
that reason the extent to which
such evidence may be received
may be limited within the
discretion of the court, and in
some jurisdictions practically
no such evidence is admitted.
Writings or documents may
generally be introduced directly
in evidence for the purpose of
proving the truth of statements
contained in them. At common law
documents purporting to be more
than thirty years old required
no particular authentication,
or, as was said, such documents
proved themselves.
The execution of other documents
must, however, be proved by the
sworn testimony of a witness to
the execution, or, if he be
dead, by proof of the
handwriting of the person who
executed the document. The
so-called best-evidence rule
applies to documentary evidence.
Briefly stated, it is that the
best evidence of the contents of
a document is the document
itself, and that no other
evidence of the contents of a
written instrument is
admissible. This rule is subject
to many exceptions, real or
apparent. Thus:
(a) Where the original
document is in duplicate form
any one of the duplicates may be
introduced in evidence as an
original.
(b) Secondary evidence
(i.e.a copy or oral testimony)
of a written notice is
admissible.
(c) Matters of public
record may be proven by
secondary evidence, in most
jurisdictions by a certified
copy of the record.
(d) Secondary evidence
may also be introduced to prove
an instrument which has been
lost or destroyed, or whenever
the other party to an action,
having the document in his
possession, fails to produce it
at the trial for the purpose of
preventing its being introduced
in evidence on due notice. One
who has willfully destroyed a
document will not, however, be
allowed to give evidence of its
contents. When proof of a
document is offered but for the
purpose of proving the truth or
untruth of any statement
contained in it, it is real
evidence, as distinguished from
a writing; and the best-evidence
rule should and probably does
not apply. The common-law rule
as to proof of documents has
been much modified by statute.
In most jurisdictions all
documents attested before a
notary or corresponding officer
are prima facie admissible in
evidence if relevant.